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• Introduction
The role that tort liability should play in compensating damages caused by family
members or people living together is open to question. The nature of these relationships,
which tend to generate bonds of solidarity and altruism, restricts the incentives and
opportunities of those affected to sue for damages. Although damages between family
members are frequent and diverse, experience shows that they hardly ever get
compensated in court. In practice, they are only claimed if, by doing it, the social rules that
normally prevent the victims from bringing an action are not violated. This happens only
when damages are covered by an insurance policy (in which case the victim is usually
entitled to demand compensation directly from the insurer within the contractual terms) or
when family life becomes disrupted because of a marriage crisis or the commission of
serious offences (furthermore, in case of a criminal offence, Spanish law provides that the
tort action must be brought by the public prosecutor -ex art. 108 LECr1- except either when
the victim has waived or reserved its right to sue or when the offence can only be
prosecuted at the request of the victim).
In addition to the moral and social rules that refrain litigation, one has to take account of
some other legal barriers. In Spanish law, for instance, the one year period of limitation
applicable to the action ex Lex Aquilia (art. 1968.2 CC 2) combined with the lack of rules
admitting suspension (art. 1932 CC) prevents spouses or other people living together, once
they separate, from claiming damages caused to each other during their life in common,
unless the harm has been sustained or has become apparent during the year before the
separation. On the other hand, if the victim is a minor under the legal authority of the
injurer, the chances that a liability claim is pursued on his behalf are slight in view of the
need to appoint a guardian ad litem with powers to bring an action (art. 299 Spanish CC),
which in practice is only feasible at the request of other close relatives. Thus, the question
of the very existence of liability often becomes blurred under social rules and legal
restrictions that afford a de facto immunity to family members (PATTI, 1984: 40-41).
This immunity, however, is being undermined by current trends, associated with liberal
individualism, which enhance the personal rights of individuals within the family,
promote the private ordering of marriage and other forms of cohabitation, and make it
easier for a person to decide whether to keep or break up a relationship on the grounds of
its individual costs and benefits (REGAN, 1999: 15-22). Such changes in the understanding
of the family, which have resulted, in Western societies, in high divorce and separation
rates, a great number of restructured families, and a diversification of models of family life,
have also reduced the factors that traditionally hindered litigation between family
members. Although the informal rules opposing this kind of litigation are still strong, the
social dynamics generates more and more situations that force legal agents to ask
                                                
1 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal (Spanish Criminal Procedure Act ).
2 Código Civil  (Spanish Civil Code)
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themselves under what precise circumstances damages caused in a domestic setting can be
tried in court (one can think, for example, of actions for damages caused  by outrageous
behaviour that led to divorce,  or actions between separated parents for damages sustained
by a common child, on the grounds of negligence in the exercise of the duty of custody). In
addition to such kind of cases, mention has to be made to the more frequent conflicts in
which third parties are involved: here the issue of the liability of family members appears
indirectly because of the need to assess contributory negligence.
The analysis of comparative legal doctrine and case law, which this essay basically reduces
to two main legal cultures of the Civil Law and the Common Law tradition, the German
and the American ones -the latter as it has been developed by federal and state courts of
the United States-, shows that  there is a certain agreement about the existence, in the
domestic and familial context, of some areas of exemption from or mitigation of liability.
Yet, differences and uncertainties remain regarding the precise boundaries of such
privileges, the categories of individuals who benefit from them  (parents, spouses, relatives
in general, people cohabiting), the kind of behaviour that the privileges are meant to
include, the legal devices that are available to their implementation (immunity,
flexibilization of the standards of care, defenses or grounds of justification) and particularly
the reasons of legal policy that endorse their preservation.
• Domestic Privileges and Immunities in the Civil Law and  the Common  Law
Tort liability in domestic relations presents remarkable differences in the legal traditions of
both the Civil Law and the Common Law:
a) In continental Europe, the codified systems of Civil Law have not established, within their tort
law provisions, any formal exception to the application of the general rules based on the existence of
a domestic relation between the tortfeasor and the victim (unlike criminal law, where close ties of
kinship can mitigate, aggravate or exclude criminal responsibility: e.g. art. 23, 180.4 and
268.1 Spanish CP 3).
However, some legal systems contain family law provisions that lay down specific standards of
care with respect to the exercise of family duties or impose compensation in case of violation of such
duties. A prominent example, quite relevant for the general scope of its rules, can be found
in the German Civil Code (BGB), where §§ 1359 and 1664 set out the standard of care quam
in suis (the level of care that people take when dealing with their own affairs) as a rule that
applies to spouses and parents when carrying out marital or parental duties. In fact, the
standard entails a privilege, because under the circumstances of the particular case permits
limitation of liability to intentional wrongdoing and gross negligence.
Thus, the Civil Law legal systems decide whether to impose liability for damages caused
between family members following two different paths:
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-One approach consists of applying specific family law rules, exclusively or in combination,
if needed, with the general rules of tort law  (in German law, for instance, §§ 1359 and 1664
BGB lay down only the standard of liability but not the grounds for it, which have to be
traced in the tort law provisions of the Code).
-Another approach, for want of specific family law rules, is simply applying the general
rules of tort liability, as the French, the Italian or the Spanish legal system do (the last, with
respect to personal injury). But this technique does not mean that these systems impose
compensation in the same terms as if the damage were caused by a third party: as we will
explain below, the open-textured nature of tort liability rules, which are based on concepts
such as "causation" or "negligence" allows the judge to take into account the typical features
of the diverse family roles (Salvador, 2000a: 4), and thus indirectly to reach outcomes
similar to those that can be achieved applying specific family law rules.
The Spanish Civil Code and the Catalan Family Code have some isolated rules that
establish explicit standards of behavior and impose compensation for the vulneration of
family duties related to the administration or disposition of property (arts. 168, 1390 and
1391 CC and arts. 145.1 and 147.1 CF 4). However, they do not refer to the consequences of
vulnerating other duties, either between spouses or between parents and children (e.g. the
vulneration of the duty of supervision, which  is a frequent source of harm to the latter). On
the other hand, the rules of tort liability from criminal acts (which have in Spain a separate
regulation) are applicable to spouses and close relatives (see, e.g., art. 298 CP). Apart from
those groups of cases (studied by ROCA TRIAS, 2000: 537-554), important areas remain,
such as the one of domestic accidents or other injuries caused by negligence, that still lack a
more precise legal or judicial treatment.
b) Most legal systems based on the Common Law devised general rules of immunity in
favor of certain groups of individuals  on account of their family ties with the victim, that
gave rise to the so-called exception of domestic relations (PROSSER, 1984: 901; FLEMING,
1998: 718, 745; DOBBS, 2000: 751). The scope and diffusion of these immunities, of judicial
origin and procedural nature, was very variable, as it has been their preservation until
today. Their typical application has been confined to two groups of cases:
-“Interspousal” immunity:
The immunity between spouses originated in the older common law and was founded,
according to legal historians, on the doctrine of marital unity, by which marriage
determined the merger of the identity of the wife with that of the husband, both becoming
a single person in law. This doctrine, of biblical echoes, which actually concealed the lack of
legal capacity of women, started to crumble in the middle of the 19th century with the
passing of Married Women’s Property Acts (from 1844 onwards in the United States, and
between 1870 and 1882 in England). These Acts granted married women the right to own
property, including the right to vindicate their property interests and to claim
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compensation, even against her husband, for damages caused to property. The courts,
however, upheld spousal immunity when it came to personal damages (either caused by
intentional wrongdoing or negligence) and replaced the empty rhetoric of the marital unity
doctrine by a discourse centered on the preservation of privacy and family harmony (about
this period, see SIEGEL, 1996: 2161-2170). The strength of these and other arguments like
the risk of fraud and collusion against insurers or the proliferation of trivial litigation,
weakened throughout the 20th century  and the courts (in the United States from 1914
onwards) began to whittle down the scope of the immunities until their complete abolition
in many jurisdictions or their preservation in residual terms (for a comprehensive global
view of the historical evolution, see TOBIAS, 1989: 361-441). The generalization of liability
insurance for damages caused by traffic accidents contributed also to the decline of the
immunity.
The Restatement of Torts 2nd, in 1977, adopted the notion, then already widespread among
state jurisdictions, of rejecting the immunity between husband and wife, while admitting at
the same time that certain conducts might be privileged due to that relationship (§ 895F: (1)
A husband or wife is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship.
(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or omission that,
because of the marital relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not tortious”).
England gave up the regime of immunities in 1962 by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife)
Act, which gave each spouse a right of action against the other in tort as though they were
not married.  Nevertheless, English law still grants the courts a discretion to stay an action
if it appears that no substantial benefit would accrue to either party, in order to prevent
trivial lawsuits (LOWE/DOUGLAS, 1998: 63-64).
-Parental immunity.
The immunity of parents with respect to their offspring was developed by United States
courts, without having any precedent in the English common law, where it never applied.
The three foundational cases (the so-called "great trilogy") date back to the period between
1891 and 1905.
The three cases are Hewellette v. George (68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885), from 1891, dealing with a
false imprisonment of a minor in a mental hospital by her mother; McKelvey v. McKelvey
(111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664), decided in 1903, in which a daughter claimed compensation
against her father and stepmother on the grounds of physical violence inflicted by the latter
with the acquiescence of the father; and Roller v. Roller (37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788), a case from
1905, which dismissed a tort action against a father who had been convicted of raping his
daughter.
The three rulings support the idea that criminal and family law remedies, like the removal
of guardianship or custody rights, must suffice against the offences committed  by the
defendants, and consider that tort law remedies are not appropriate for several reasons,
such as the need to keeping the social and domestic peace, the need to grant wide
discretion to parents in order to discipline and control their children, the risk of fraud and
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collusion between relatives against insurers, the detriment that siblings of the victim could
experience due to a depletion of the father´s assets, the possibility that the father might
inherit the injured child's recovery in case that the latter died before, and the analogy to the
spousal immunity (see HOLLISTER, 1982: 493-508). These reasons soon fell into disrepute
and did not resist the passing of time, the transformations in society and the changes in the
understanding of the family. In the end, as it happened to the immunity between spouses,
the courts narrowed the scope of the parental immunity down, and replaced it with the
acceptance of certain areas of latitude in the exercise of parental authority or the
application of a more flexible standard to parents (the so-called "reasonable and prudent
parent" standard).
To illustrate this evolution, authors usually highlight three cases as well. In Goller v. White
(20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W. 2d 193), settled in 1963, a twelve-year-old minor in foster care
claimed compensation against his foster father for serious injuries sustained in an accident
for which the defendant had been allegedly negligent. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held that parental immunity should be abrogated, except in two situations:  where the act
involves an exercise of parental authority over the child, and where it involves the exercise
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food and other care. As an
alternative to this rule, that was considered too deferential with parents, the Supreme Court
of California decided in Gibson vs. Gibson (3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d648,92 Cal. Rptr. 288), a
case of 1971, to limit the privileges as to the exercise of parental authority. The court
insisted on evaluating how reasonable the act of the defendant was, viewed in light of the
parental role (reasonable parent test). This criterion was considered too burdensome for
parents and soon after New York’s Court of Appeal qualified it. The Court held that failure
to adequately supervise a child is not a tort allowing the victim to sue his father, and a third
party who is liable for the damage cannot counterclaim against the father on the grounds of
contributory negligence (the leading case, of 1974, is Holodook vs. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 364
N.Y.S.2d 859, 324 N.E.2d 1268) (about these and other related cases, see HOLLISTER: 1982,
508-527; ROONEY/ROONEY: 1991, 1166-1174; PIPINO, 1992: 1117-1133).
The Restatement of Torts 2nd also rejects the immunity of the father and the mother in the
same terms as it rejects the immunity between spouses. The official comment to the rule
points out that the intimacies of family life may affect the determination of whether conduct
is negligent or not. Likewise, echoing some of the rulings cited, it is acknowledged that the
exercise of parental authority requires discretion that should be reasonably protected
(AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1979: 426-431)
The progressive dismissal of tort immunities has significantly reduced the substantial
differences between the Common Law and the Civil Law. Although a few jurisdictions
remain in the United States that still retain, more or less restricted, the old immunities,
nowadays the trend is to replace them with privileges of substantive law, elaborated on a
case-by-case basis, according to which the decision for imposing liability or granting a
privilege depends on the definition and content of family legal duties and powers (in line
with Goller o Holodook) or on specific standards of care suitable for each type of domestic
relation (in line with Gibson). Therefore, as Dan B. DOBBS (2000: 757) rightly points out
when analizing the rationales for parental immunity and the mechanisms to implement it -
in terms reminiscent of the two options available in Europe- "the only question is whether
categories like "supervision" or "parental discretion" will help judges focus on relevant
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policies better than the ordinary negligence rules. The negiglence rules have the advantage
of doing what courts do best by focusing on the facts and the justice of the particular case".
• Family Status, Cohabitation, and Exercise of Family Legal Roles
What are the relevant policies that should underpin a model of tort liability in private or
family life?  Should that model be implemented from tort law or from family law? The
analysis of the historical evolution of comparative law suggests the opportunity of
differentiating and discussing three possible rationales as a grounds for exemption from or
mitigation of liability: a) the status of the tortfeasor and the victim as family members
(criterion which has been paramount for decades in determining the scope of immunities in
the Common Law); b) the cohabitation between the tortfeasor and the victim; c) the
connection of harmful conduct with the exercise of a family legal role or the fulfilment of
family legal duties (which has been a common ground for lessening liability in European
law and has also been adopted by many United States courts after the abandonment of the
immunities).
1. The inconsistencies of a system of privileges based on the family status of the
tortfeasor and the victim.
The system of tort immunities, as it was defined by the traditional Common Law, was
based exclusively on the tortfeasor being related to the victim by a status familiae.  In its
original version, where immunity was complete, the mere fact of being a spouse or a parent
determined the exemption from liability without regard to other circumstances, such as the
nature of the activity, the kind of damage inflicted, or the intentional character of the
wrongdoing.  Such immunity was indeed a very simple rule to administer by the courts,
but also a quite rudimentary device, typical of an undeveloped tort law. It was historically
related to a patriarchal ideology of the family, based on relations of power and submission
between their members that the legal system reaffirmed under the pretence of preserving
peace and privacy within the family and preventing  frivolous litigation.
The truth is, however, that immunity for intentional wrongdoing encourages opportunist
behaviour (BRINIG,2000: 116) and does not contribute to keeping the remainder of peace
and harmony that may subsist in a family.  Likewise, its extension to activities which are
not essentially domestic (e.g. professional or traffic accidents) not only excludes recovery
from significant losses but also hinders, for no convincing reason, both the preventive
function of tort law in activities affecting third parties, and its distributive function of the
cost of accidents (in so far as the immunity prevents family members from any resort to the
insurance market). On the other hand, the assertion that family immunities refrain trivial
suits is premised on paternalistic assumptions: because individuals wish to protect their
family relationships, they are in a better position than judges and legislators to ascertain
the effect of litigation on domestic life (TOBIAS, 1989:445).
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These critiques, historically raised by some American tort law scholars as a reaction against
a system that was deemed to be unfair, explain the gradual appearance of a series of
exceptions to the immunity rules, like the exclusion of intentionally inflicted injuries, of
damages sustained in the course of a business or other activities subject to strict liability
and thus usually covered by insurance,  and of cases of wrongful death, where there is no
family peace to be preserved  (PROSSER/KEATON, 1984: 902-907; DOBBS, 2000: 752, 754-
755). Such exceptions progressively subverted the very nature of the immunities as
exoneration rules adressed to avoid any close examination of the merits of family suits, and
prompted, in the end, their abolition by legislatures or courts and their replacement with
substantive criteria of exclusion from or mitigation of liability adopted on a case-by-case
basis.
In addition to that, the system of immunities does not fit well with prevailing trends of
modern family law, which  favor the private ordering of marriage and other intimate
relationships (thus multiplying  the models of cohabitation), enhance individual rights in
the domestic sphere, set up very intense policies of children protection, and tend to
decrease the importance of family status (e.g. EEKELAAR, 2001:184).  On the other hand, it
has to be said, though, that the communitarian discourse, very sensitive to the symbolic
function of legal rules, still gives support to the idea that family status should generate per
se some kind of immunity.  According to this discourse, the rules of immunity would
contribute to a cultural understanding of marriage and other domestic relations in which
the collective dimension of personal identity and its values –commitment, mutual trust and
solidarity - would prevail.  The so-called "adverse testimony privilege", that prevents a
spouse from testifying  against the other in a criminal trial for offences committed against a
third party, can be explained in this way (REGAN, 1999:106-135).  A similar view is held by
Margaret BRINIG (2000:101-104, 127-130) who, although from a perspective of economic
analysis of law, considers tort immunities as a way to promote family harmony and unity.
Immunities would reflect, according to this opinion, an implicit agreement in the family -
called “covenant”, as opposed to “contract", by the author-  "where no one considers suing
another or requires precise accountings either of money or of behavior" (ibidem, 129).  Her
defence of immunities is, in any case, very qualified (as she excludes intentional damages)
and can be interpreted as a willingness to privilege domestic relations and to reinforce
discretion in the exercise of family functions. We will turn to these issues in the following
sections.
2. Living together as a mitigating factor of liability in domestic accidents.
The influence of domestic relations  in determining tort liability can be displayed in a
different manner, more in accordance with contemporary family law, by reducing the
relevance of family status to those cases where the parties intend to litigate about the
consequences of infringing family legal duties and, at the same time, by giving greater
weight to the notion of cohabitation as a grounds of justification that permits exemption
from or reduction of liability. By doing it, two types of privileges seem to coexist and in
some cases overlap, though remaining analytically diverse. The first should stem from the
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undertaking  of a family role, shaped in its basic features by family law, and apply, in
essence, to parents exercising parental authority or custody over their minor or
incompetent children (parental privilege).  The second should be linked to cohabitation,
extent to all individuals living together as a family unit (or in a family-like stable
relationship) and be limited in its objective scope to domestic accidents and other damages
directly related to the life in common (domestic privilege).
It is no easy  task to trace the reception of this second type of privilege in Spanish case law,
because people living together, as we said, tend not to sue each other  for damages, except in
cases of gross negligence or intentional  wrongdoing which should not be covered by the
privilege. One has to take account also of the one year period of limitation for tort actions (art.
1968.2 CC) and the impossibility to suspend its running during cohabitation.  This easily results
in the extinction of claims between people living together before their life in common comes to an
end. Most legal systems in Europe take the opposite view, by providing that marriage suspends
the prescription of actions between spouses, and parental authority and guardianship do the
same between parents or other guardians and children (see, e.g., art. 2252 and 2253 French CC; §
204 BGB; art. 2941 Italian CC; art. 2905 and 2906 Quebec CC.)
The domestic privilege is a rule that integrates in the assessment of liability, from the
perspective both of a wrongdoer and a victim, the rules of behavior and values that
characterize, according to social beliefs, living together. The key notes that allow us to
make such an assessment can be found along two lines of reasoning that legal scholars
have put forward to support family privileges:
-In relationships of cohabitation, people behave and interact as they are, in accordance with their
natural or acquired qualities, free from subjection to specific duties of care.  Privacy brings
about a more relaxed attitude in people and helps the development of personal freedom
without special restrictions.  This freedom entails the duty of those living together to accept
each other as they are, and bars them from demanding from the others a more cautious
form of behaviour than that adopted by them in their own affairs (quam in suis) (WACKE,
2000: 272). In domestic life, everybody needs to admit that one's interests are inevitably
exposed to the influence of the others (HÜBNER/VOLPPEL, 2000:589). This idea requires
applying to domestic relations a subjective standard of care: while care in business and in
most social activities has an objective character, in domestic relations tort law takes into
account  individual abilities and shortcomings.
A usual explanation for “quam in suis” can be found in the consent of the victim and in his duty to
assume his own acts:  the individual who chooses an untrustworthy or poorly skilled companion
as a husband or wife must cope with the consequencies of its so choosing (WACKE, ibidem).  But
this argument, though admissible to a certain extent for adults living together, is not suitable to
explain why the rule applies to those relations not created by consent, such as the
intergenerational ones.  This objection has questioned the application of such standard to parents
and children (HINZ, 1992: 621).  Between parents and children, quam in suis can be justified by
reasons linked to the parental privilege, to which we will refer later.
- On the other hand, there is a principle of solidarity among family members, which can be
seen in the existence of a "community of economy, destiny, and responsibility" which the
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law deems worthy of being protected (DIEDERICHSEN, apud KNOLLE, 1999: 34:
"Wirtschafts-, Schicksals- und Haftungsgemeinschaft”).  It follows on from this principle that
the victim of damage caused by another member of the family has a duty of tolerance and
forbearance (WACKE, 2000: 274; BRINIG, 2000: 129) and a duty to not disturb the family
peace by taking grievances to court (KNOLLE, 1999: 33, 41, with further quotations;
ENGLER, 2000: 86).  From this point of view, of obvious communitarian connotations,
domestic relations have to be accepted as they are, regardless of their individual costs and
benefits, in the belief that preserving and strengthening shared goals and common interests
is as important a social aim as is protecting individual rights (REGAN, 1999: 11, 22-29).
The idea of solidarity may also appear, in some cases, in the form of a demand for fairness.
According to this notion, claiming recovery against the tortfeasor with the same harshness
that one would employ against a stranger has to be regarded as unfair if the defendant
made provisions (food,  education, and so on) to the plaintiff's benefit. This reasoning has
been used to justify the mitigation of liability for parents (HOFFMANN, 1967: 1210), but it
could be extended to other persons assuming responsibility for looking after the victim, be
it on a formal level,  as a guardian or foster parent, or on an informal level, as a step-parent
cohabiting with the father or the mother).  Thus, some authors have suggested that it
would be fair  to extend domestic privileges to cohabitants or new spouses responsible for
accidents suffered by the couple’s children, in order not to discourage their taking on
informal duties of supervision and care in the children’s daily life (LEIB, 1996: 842-844).
However, fairness, as solidarity, must not apply as a defence in labor relations (see, for
instance, BGH NJW 1996, 53, where the German Supreme Court fairly rejected the
extension of the privilege of § 1664 BGB to a family assistant).
At the level of positive law, the extent of domestic privileges and the techniques for
implementation of them depend on the dogmatic resources of each legal system. In
particular, they can be implemented from either family law or tort law:
-German law shows a way to elaborate privileges of liability from the norms of family law.
Court decisions have construed extensively the notion of “duties emanating from the
spousal relationship” (§ 1359 BGB: "sich aus dem ehelichen Verhältnis ergebenden Verpflichtun-
gen") in order to include any kind of conduct attributable to husband or wife that might
cause damage in the domestic sphere (WACKE, 2000: 275).  As a result, the norm has
turned into a proper domestic privilege between spouses.  When it comes to relations
between parents and children, authors disagree and many of them tend to exclude parents
in breach of their duty of supervision from the privilege of § 1664 BGB, making them liable
in accordance with the general rules of tort liability (e.g. ENGLER, 2000: 92-93;  HINZ,
1992: 622-623; against, KNOLLE, 1999, 67-70).  In any event, the rules of family law are not
always suitable as a grounds for domestic privileges because of the difficulty of extending
their application to people not expressly embraced by them, thus requiring a rather forced
use of analogy (e.g., cohabitants, relatives by affinity, siblings).
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-The domestic privilege can also be implemented from tort law through a flexible use of the
techniques of objective and subjective attribution of responsibility. In this regard, for
example, there has been a proposal to exclude the attribution of certain damages by
applying either the principle of consent as a grounds of justification, or the principle of
assumption of risk (in case of a relationship to which parties have freely consented), and
also to lessen the standard of reasonable care in domestic settings in tune with the less
careful behavior which is common in private life (AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1979:
426, 430).  Similarly, Spanish scholars have interpreted the lack of judicial decisions in
Spanish courts about domestic accidents as a tacit evidence of a privilege that would adjust
the criteria for attribution of liability to the prevailing social norms, thus circumscribing
recovery of damages to deliberate wrongdoing or gross negligence (SALVADOR/RUIZ,
2000B: 46; SALVADOR/RAMOS/LUNA, 2000c: 9).
The exoneration from liability in case of ordinary negligence and the upholding of it in case
of willful wrongdoing and gross negligence is a common feature of legal systems admitting
any form of domestic privilege. In Germany, for instance, the rule quam in suis does not
exempt deliberate wrongdoing or gross negligence from liability (§ 277 BGB).  The discount
of ordinary negligence does not seem to have an impact on the preventive function of tort
liability because the loss suffered by the victim, especially if it is of a serious character,
tends to have a negative impact on the welfare of the tortfeasor, who may suffer it as his
own or may have to take on part of its costs through personal or financial assistance
(domestic relations generate functions of interdependent utility). On the contrary, grossly
negligent or fraudulent behaviour does not comply with the conditions that the granting of
the privilege depends on: the freedom to behave at ease in the intimacy of one's home
cannot justify foolish or reckless behavior, and even less deliberate harm. Obviously
victims do not need to tolerate or show solidarity with respect to this behaviour either.
As we said, domestic accidents are the natural sphere for application of a privilege based
on the notion of living together. Domestic accidents stem from acts or omissions that take
place at home as a consequence of daily interaction,  but the protective scope of the rule can
be extended to other settings (e.g., leisure activities outside the home).  In foreign legal
systems, the most contested case is that of traffic accidents, about which a position prevails
against considering them as a privileged activity.  Taking into account the impact of this
activity on traffic safety and its great potential to harm third parties, general prevention
justifies keeping it under the standards of care and criteria of attribution of liability typical
of car driving and not under the more subjective and relaxed ones characteristic of
domestic life (see, in German law, GERNHUBER/COESTER-WALTJEN, 1994:260; and
with reservations, WACKE, 2000, 277; KNOLLE, 1999: 60-63).  Thus, in traffic accidents the
driver is judged according to his role as a driver and not as a father, mother, son, daughter
or spouse. Nowadays, the mandatory insurance coverage for personal injuries and the
optional one for damages to property simplifies the problem and makes a stronger case for
applying the liability rules typical for car accidents.
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The same stance against domestic privileges has to be upheld with respect to professional
accidents  (for example, those taking place in a family business).  The  privilege only
protects the conditions under which living together takes place, and is not meant to
safeguard the exercise of economic activities whose risks are anyway susceptible to
insurance.
3. Tort liability and other remedies for breach of family duties.
The study of liability privileges in domestic relations leads us finally to the analysis of the
remedies which are available to compensate damages caused by omission or other forms of
breach of family legal duties.  To this effect, the focus of attention has to be displaced from
the idea of living together as a basis for privileged treatment of family members or
cohabitants to the exercise of family legal functions. The scope of these functions and the
consequences attached to their infringement are determined by social norms and, on a legal
level, by rules of family law which provide specific remedies (such as separation or
divorce, loss of custody over children, suspension or deprivation of parental authority) and
even allow, in some cases, economic compensation. As we will see, resort to compensatory
remedies is however limited, especially for breach of marital duties, because modern
family law rejects the coercive imposition of obligations that restrict aspects which are
central to the personal sense of identity (EEKELAAR, 2001:191).
a. Liability for breach of spousal duties?
The understanding of marriage as a community of life assumed and maintained on a
voluntary basis determines that spousal duties -mainly those of personal character- are not
enforceable: any claim seeking to obtain specific performance of matrimonial conduct is
contrary to the nature of that community (SALVADOR/RUIZ, 2000b: 47, 63). The same can
be said of any form of surrogate performance: matrimonial duties can only be fulfilled by
free moral decision of each spouse, and it would be incoherent to grant indirect means of
enforcing them.  One should also bear in mind that it is very difficult to fashion the
measure of the inflicted damages, that tort actions also have a very limited power of
deterrence to prevent abuses or other vulnerations of marital duties, and that interspousal
suits have merely wealth redistributing effects, against which insurance is not possible
(ELLMANN/ SUGARMAN, 1287-1289).  It follows, therefore, that the vulneration of
marital duties has only, as a general rule, the consequences prescribed by marriage law,
which in Spain are limited to the right to bring an action for separation or divorce (arts. 82
and 86 CC) (see, however, LUNA/SANCHO, 1997: 103-104).
The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code and Catalan Family Code that regulate the
economic consequences of a marriage break-up allow the judge to order periodical
payments in favor of the spouse whose economic situation has worsened due to the
separation or divorce (arts. 97 CC and 84 CF), but this sort of compensation,  like any other
measure that may be taken, is not linked to the reasons that justify separation or divorce or
to the fault of one of the parties. In this context, the admission of compensation for
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damages on account of adultery or breach of other duties that spouses owe each other,
would not only increase the costs of marriage (SALVADOR/RUIZ, op. cit. 63) but also
distort that legal principle, which has earned a high level of consensus among judges and
scholars, and reintroduce, through the back door, a fault-based system of separation or
divorce, increasing the strain in marriage crises. There are still countries in Europe whose
legal systems admit compensation for material or moral damages when the cause for
divorce is exclusively attributable to one of the spouses (see, e.g., art. 266 French CC), but
they always do so as a specific economic consequence of separation and divorce. Spanish
law has a similar rule with respect to nullity of marriage, granting a right of compensation
for damages  to the bona fide spouse (art. 98 CC and, applying the law prior to the reform of
1981, STS, 1ª, 26.11.1985).  But apart from this rather exceptional case, the silence of the
Code on this matter has to be interpreted against any right of recovery for damages.
The discussion over the compensation of damages (including pain and suffering) caused by
breach of spousal duties was raised in two cases decided by SSTS, 1ª, 22.7.99 and 30.7.99. In both
lawsuits the plaintiffs claimed compensation against their ex-wives for economic and emotional
harm suffered because of adultery and deception over the legal status of several children that had
been conceived out of wedlock. Having successfully challenged their paternity, the plaintiffs
sought compensation (on the grounds of contractual liability in one case, and on tort, in the other)
for maintenance payments that they had made in the past and for emotional distress. The
Supreme Court rejected both claims: in the case decided on 22.7.1999 it held that adultery was
irrelevant as a ground for compensation and that there was no evidence, on the defendant's part,
of intentional hiding the third party's biological paternity.  In the decision of 30.7.1999, which did
not admit the claim for restitution of maintenance payments for procedural reasons, the Court
held that the only legal consequence of infidelity was its legal consideration as a ground for
separation ("Otherwise, any disturbance of  matrimonial life would give rise to liability for
damages",  FD 3).
The exclusion of compensation does not apply , however, to behaviour that causes damage
to rights or interests of the other spouse that can be conceptually separated from the
interest in keeping marriage together or in getting respect for its rules.  Thus, harm caused
to the spouse's physical or psychic integrity, health, freedom, honour, privacy or sexual
freedom, as well as to the economic assets, may be compensated. Yet, the difficulty in
discerning the conducts that deserve compensation from other violations of marital
obligations that cannot be compensated (especially in the area of damages for emotional
distress sustained by breach of duties of fidelity, respect and mutual help) explain the
proposals to provide the system with more certainty resorting to the categories that have
been framed by the criminal law. Criminal statutes define conducts that harm different
types of protected interests, whose comission gives rise not only to penalties but to
monetary compensation as well (ROCA, 2000:552-554; RAGEL, 2000: 159).  Resorting to
criminal law rules is also a way to acknowledge the beliefs of the majority in our societies
about the greater or lesser disapproval that certain conducts deserve (domestic violence,
for instance, generates nowadays greater repulse than infidelity) and may clarify which
damages are to be compensated (e.g., those caused by acts of domestic violence, ex 153 CP,
or by the deliberate or grossly negligent transmission of a venereal disease, ex art. 147 and
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152 CP) and which not (e.g., psychic harm suffered by a spouse discovering adultery or a
mistaken paternity).
Other legal systems have followed similar techniques, although not necessarily resorting to
the rules of criminal law.  The German Supreme Court, for instance, which has clearly
denied compensation for damages arising from adultery or a mistaken attribution of
paternity (MARKESINIS, 1997: 312-334), has recognized in extreme cases the right to be
compensated ex  § 826 BGB -for intentional causation of damage contra bonos mores- if
adultery could be linked to a qualified intention to cause damage, as in the case where a
husband was positively deceived concerning the paternity of a child (BGH 19.12.1989, NJW
1990: 706).  In the United States of America, since the eighties, the removal of spousal
immunity provoked a proliferation of tort litigation between spouses for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, which generated serious difficulties of legal policy. State
courts have moved towards admitting compensation for these kinds of damages if the
relevant behavior can be appraised as especially outrageous by a jury (outrageousness
test).  The test requires a case-by-case examination of whether the conduct is socially so
out-of-bounds as to deserve recovery (see ELLMANN/SUGARMAN, 1996: 1330-1343,
proposing to limit claims to criminal conduct).
b. Omission and defective fulfilment of parental duties
The reasons that support the idea of relegating tort liability between spouses in favour of
other remedies addressed to facilitate separation of the parties do not fully apply to parent-
child relations. In contrast to spouses, parents and children under their authority make an
unequal relationship, not  created by consensus (except in the case, here of little relevance,
of the adoption of children over 12: art. 177.1 CC, art 121 CF) and characterised by a strong
dependency and vulnerability of children. Furthermore, exit from such relationship is
extremely difficult and costly: although family law provides for coercive intervention of
public authorities or courts when parental duties have been violated,  such remedies only
take place in cases of high risk or persistent and serious abuse or neglect of parental
functions. In spite of that, there are substantial reasons that justify privileging the exercise
of parental authority and, in particular, limiting the exposure of parents  to tort actions,
although the extent of such parental privilege varies in comparative case law and is also
open to discussion by scholars both in Europe and the United States  (see, largely,
KNOLLE, 1999: 53-56, 70-88; PIPINO, 1992: 1127-1133; VANCE, 1995: 442-469).
The deferential treatment towards parents often overlaps with the previously examined
domestic privilege enjoyed by people living together, and this explains why it is usually
related to some of the reasons that justify the latter, such as the duty of solidarity among
close relatives –which would reach the greatest intensity between parents and their
offspring- and the purpose of protecting family peace (ENGLER, 2000: 85-86; BRINIG, 2000:
129-130).  However, it seems important to keep those privileges apart. The parental
privilege, unlike its domestic counterpart, only applies within the exercise of parental
authority (and therefore only in relation to minors or incompetent children) and it does not
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require living together (it applies, for instance, to parents not having custody of their
children but that still keep parental authority and visitation rights).  On top of that, it has
its own justifications, that are related to the unique features of a parent-child relationship,
and, in particular, to the need for latitude in the exercise of the parental funtions of
upbringing, education and care of the children.
It has been held, in this regard, that a parent-child relationship is comparable to a fiduciary
relationship (SCOTT/SCOTT, 1995: 2401), where it is difficult to foresee beforehand all
contingencies that may arise and specify how parents have to react in each of them (leaving
aside the fact that, in many cases, there will not be social consensus about it).  In this
setting, taking into account the deep affective bonds that a parent-child relationship
generates, the most sensible approach is to grant wide powers to parents –as people do in
relationships based on trust- on account of their privileged position to assess what is best
for their children (parental judgement rule) (ibidem, 2438).  The role of law should then be
limited to establishing a set of minimal conditions to be complied with in the exercise of the
parental role (e.g., food provision, compulsory schooling, health care, and so on) and
supervise its observance through criminal, administrative or family law in those cases
where social control mechanisms have proved insufficient.  Yet, a judge should not be
allowed to review ex post the exercise of that discretion –within the mentioned boundaries-
and penalize parents for misjudgements or deviations from the prevailing social views,
unless the threshold of gross negligence or intentional wrongdoing has been surpassed (in
which case, discretion does not play a role anymore).
Therefore, the parental privilege would basically extend to areas where the exercise of
discretion is pronounced (education, professional guidance, administration of assets),
including personal supervision and decisions to determine how much independence a
child should enjoy. Although no general indications about the  limits of parental discretion
can  be given, it is possible to draw groups of cases from several criteria developed by
courts by deciding whether the parental duty of care has been breached.  The most
important criterion, with respect to the duty of care, is the age of the child: while in early
childhood the parents’ duty of care is very stringent, later it becomes relaxed and is even
replaced, in teenage years, by a duty of self-care. In fact, if there are reasons for
contributory negligence, judges tend to attribute any reduction of or even exoneration from
liability for damages sustained by a teenager to the victim's own conduct, instead of
attributing it to the violation of the parental duties of care  (see a case law review in
FERRER/RUISANCHEZ, 1999: 9-10, and later, STS, 1ª, 30.12.1999).
The adaptation of the standard of care to the subjective aptitude for exercising a parental
role can also be explained by the typically altruistic nature of the parent-child relationship
and the idiosyncratic value that the child attaches to such relationship, even when parental
performance could, on social terms, be rated as substandard  (SCOTT/SCOTT, 1995: 2433).
Assuming that parents tend to behave for the benefit of children, negligent behaviour
usually can be explained either as a momentary oversight -something which is very
difficult to prevent- or as a consequence of personal and social conditions of the parents -
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which tort law cannot modify-. Then, the imposition of tort liability would increase the
costs of paternity and maternity without improving prevention. In the worst case scenario,
it could discourage parents to take on their parental duties, whose exercise is, in global
terms, socially essential and very valuable for children.  On the other hand, when parents'
behaviour is so detrimental to children that it is not covered by any privilege and gives rise
to liability, one has to think of the difficulties of implementing tort compensation within
the family unit and the problems that may ensue from the limited solvency of the injurers.
These factors explain the usual resort to remedies other than compensation, such as
administrative or judicial measures that modify custody conditions or deprive parents
from their authority over children.
A final issue which deserves attention for its practical consequences is the interference of
parental privileges –like other domestic privileges- on the attribution of liability to
concurrent wrongdoers outside the family circle. Familial and domestic privileges are
meant to have inter partes effect,  and their cost -the cost of family solidarity and latitude of
judgement in private affairs- must not be shifted to third parties.  If parents, as usually
happens, bring an action in tort on behalf of their children against a third party, Spanish
courts usually discount from the compensation owed to the victim the share of liability that
can be attributed to contributory negligence of any of the parents (see
FERRER/RUISANCHEZ, 1999: 10-11, and later, STS, 1ª, 16.5.2000).  The reduction in
compensation takes place whether or not the careless behavior of the parent is covered by
any form of privilege: against a third party, parental negligence has to be assessed
objectively, disregarding any personal circumstances.
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